We derive a theory-based gravity-type equation that determines the main drivers of international technology diffusion under perfect enforcement of intellectual property rights. We estimate the gravity equation using bilateral royalty payments data for a sample of 53 countries and the period 1995-2012 to infer the amount of technology diffusion predicted by the model. We then analyze differences between the model and the data, and find that they are mainly driven by characteristics of the importing-technology country that are not captured by the model. We explore the role of three channels: (i) imperfect intellectual property rights protection, (ii) the structure of production, and (iii) profit-shifting motives. Controlling for these three channels significantly improves the fit of the model: (i) and (ii) are especially relevant for developing economies, whereas (iii) is important for tax havens.
Introduction
Technological change is an important source of economic growth. Developing countries find it less costly to adopt foreign technologies than to develop them with domestic resources (see Keller, 2004 , for a comprehensive survey on the topic). Developed countries may also benefit from technology adoption by developing countries if markets for technology work, as foreign adoption may increase innovative efforts of firms transferring technology (Maskus, 2004) . However, markets for technology are subject to failure. In this paper, we address two questions: (i) What are the drivers of international technology diffusion? (ii) What distortions may affect international technology diffusion?.
Unfortunately, there are no good data on direct measures of international technology diffusion, as there are many channels through which technology could spread across countries.
In this paper, a technology is a blueprint to produce an intermediate good, and we analyze market channels of technology diffusion, which from now on we refer to as technology transfer.
A domestic firm that develops a new technology can access a foreign market in several ways:
(i) through international trade, by using the technology to produce a good domestically and exporting it abroad (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister, 2009; Keller, 1998 Keller, , 2002 Keller, , 2004 Santacreu, 2015) ; (ii) through foreign direct investment (FDI), by creating a foreign affiliate in the country of interest and licensing the technology to produce the good there (Guadalupe, Kuzmina, and Thomas, 2012; Keller and Yeaple, 2009; Yang and Maskus, 2001) , and (iii) through licensing of the technology to a third party in a foreign country in exchange for a royalty fee (Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley, 2006) .
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These channels are all important sources of diffusion and have been found to create positive spillovers in the foreign market. However, we focus on (ii) and (iii) for two reasons. On the one hand, technology licensing to either affiliates or unaffiliated parties captures a more direct form of technology diffusion (see Yang and Maskus, 2001; Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley, 2006; Mandelman and Waddle, 2019) . On the other hand, there are data available on cross-country payments for the use of foreign intellectual property (IP). These data are recorded in the balance of payments of a country as a trade in services, and include both intra-firm and third-party payments for the use of foreign IP. For instance, consider a U.S.-based manufacturer of chips that wants to expand to the Chinese market with a license. The U.S manufacturer could enter an agreement with a Chinese firm to use their product patent in return for a payment. The Chinese firm could then manufacture and sell the chips in China. This transaction would be recorded as an export of services from the United States' perspective and an import of services from China's perspective.
We explore three market failures for this form of technology transfer. First, imperfect enforcement of IP rights (IPR) may deter developed countries from transferring technology to profitable markets, as the threat of imitation in those markets would affect negatively the innovator's profits. Second, differences in taxation and regulations between the country transferring the technology and that receiving the technology could drive international technology transfer for reasons other than the expected profitability of the country receiving the technology. For instance, suppose a U.S. corporation develops a patent domestically and licenses it to their subsidiary located in Ireland. The royalty charged by the U.S. company could be set very low in order to avoid paying taxes in the United States. In this case, most of the income would reside in Ireland and be taxed at the corporate income tax rate there, which is only 12.5%. This form of income shifting is common among large U.S. multinational companies with significant IPs (Guvenen et al., 2017; Bruner, Rassier, and Ruhl, 2018) . Third, the structure of production and exports of the destination country also matters for determining the profitability of an innovation. For instance, if a country specializes in low-technology sectors in which the sender of technology is not very innovative, it will be less profitable to send technology there, as the country will not be able to market that technology and make it profitable.
To address our first question on what drives international technology transfer, we start by developing a multicountry one-sector endogenous growth model of innovation and knowledge diffusion in which there is perfect enforcement of IPR. Our model yields predictions for the amount of technology transfer-in the form of royalties-between a domestic country (i.e, the innovator or exporter of technology) and a foreign country (i.e., the adopter or importer of technology), based on characteristics of the two countries. We assume perfect enforcement of IPR, and we abstract from intra-firm technology transfers that are driven by differences in taxation and in the legal systems across countries. We also abstract from differences in the structure of production and exports across countries, as we consider only one sector.
Our model delivers an expression for bilateral royalty payments that resembles a gravity equation in which technology transfer depends on the characteristics of the exporter and importer of technology and on a country-pair parameter that reflects the strength of knowledge flows between the countries.
2 According to the gravity equation, royalty payments can be expressed as a function of exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects, and a countrypair specific parameter that captures the extent to which countries are connected through knowledge spillovers. Our model yields predictions for the economic characteristics behind the fixed effects. In particular, the exporter-time fixed effects are explained by the exporter's innovative capacity and its productivity, whereas the importer-time fixed effects are driven by the profitability of the importer, which depends on size and a remoteness index (how far the importer is from potential markets). We do not model explicitly the main drivers of the strength of knowledge spillovers, and we treat them as an exogenous parameter. We build the model to discipline our empirical analysis but do not do a quantitative analysis to run counterfactuals.
We estimate the gravity equation implied by our model using data on bilateral royalty payments for a sample of 53 countries during the period 1995-2012. Deviations of these predictions from the data shed light on the channels that drive royalty payments away from these fundamentals. We use the Poisson Pseudo Makimum Likelihood (PPML) estimation approach developed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and regress time-varying bilateral royalty payments on a country-pair fixed effect-our proxy for knowledge spillovers-and exporter and importer time-varying fixed effects. 3 This gravity regression fits the data almost perfectly. The United States, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland send-on average-more IP abroad (i.e, have higher exporter fixed effects); the United States, Japan, Ireland, and Singapore receive-on average-more IP from abroad (i.e., have higher importer fixed effects).
We then use the predictions of our model to explore the fundamental drivers of the exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects that we obtained from the estimation of our gravity equation. First, we regress the exporter-time fixed effects on data for the innovative capacity of the exporter and productivity (i.e., R&D spending and GDP per capita) and compute the predicted value of this regression. We compare this predicted value with the exporter-time fixed effects from the gravity equation. We find that the United States, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Ireland all have larger exporter fixed effects from gravity than those predicted by our model's economic fundamentals. That is, these countries are sending more technology abroad than what would be expected given their productivity (GDP per capita) and their innovative capacity. In the case of Ireland, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, this discrepancy may be driven by taxation and profit-shifting motives (see Guvenen et al., 2017; Bruner, Rassier, and Ruhl, 2018) . Second, we regress the importer-time fixed effects on data on the importer's market profitability, which we measure by the importer's size (i.e, GDP) and a remoteness index. We find that Ireland, Singapore, Switzerland and
Luxembourg are all receiving more technology (i.e., receiving more royalty payments) than predicted by our model, which could be explained again by their low corporate income tax.
On the contrary, we find that Lithuania, India, Russia, Turkey and China are all receiving less technology (i.e., paying less royalties) than predicted by our model. This could be explained by imperfect enforcement of IPR in these countries, deterring developed countries from sending technology there, or the specialization of these countries in low technologyintensive sectors. Finally, although in our model the strength of knowledge spillovers is treated as an exogenous parameter, we regress the country-pair fixed effects on geographic variables used in the trade literature. We find that distance has a negative impact on international technology transfer, whereas sharing a language has a positive impact. However, geography explains just 10% of the variation of royalty payments in the data.
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Having identified the main characteristics driving technology transfer, we use our model to evaluate deviations between the model and the data. We proceed by doing a PPML estimation in which, instead of including exporter-time, importer-time, and pair-wise fixed effects, we regress royalty payments on the main economic fundamental variables predicted by our model. We find that our model can predict the evolution of international technology diffusion observed in the data quite well, with a few exceptions. 
The Model
Here, we build a multi-country one-sector endogenous growth model of innovation and knowledge diffusion to discipline our empirical analysis. This model is a version of Eaton and Kortum (1999) and Cai, Santacreu, and Li (2017) 
Households
In each country there is a representative household with lifetime utility
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and C it represents consumption of country i at time t.
The household consumes and also finances the R&D activities of entrepreneurs, and it owns all the firms. In return, the household receives labor income and the profits generated by entrepreneurs.
The household's budget constraint is given by
In this expression, P it is the price of the final good (to be defined later), a it is the household's holding of firms' shares, r it is the return on assets, Π it is the profit of firms that the household receives because it finances firms' R&D activities, W it L it is labor income, and TD it is the trade deficit.
Production
In each country i, a domestic final producer uses traded intermediate goods ω to produce a nontraded good (Y it ) according to a constant elasticity of substitution technology as follows:
In this expression, σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods and
is the demand of intermediate goods.
In each country i, there is a continuum of intermediate producers indexed by ω ∈ [0, 1] that use labor l it (ω) to produce a traded intermediate good ω according to the following constant-returns-to-scale technology
Firms are heterogeneous in their productivity z it (ω). The cost of producing each intermediate
where c it (ω) is the cost of production of variety ω and W it is the nominal wage rate.
Intermediate producers operate under Bertrand competition. Their equilibrium prices are characterized next. 7
International Trade
Trade in goods is costly. In particular, there are iceberg transport costs so that shipping a good produced in country i to country n requires producing d ni > 1 units of the good in country i. We assume that the "triangular" inequality holds; thus d ih d hn > d in . We assume Bertrand competition as in Bernard et al. (2003) . As in the case of perfect competition, with
Bertrand competition, final producers buy from the lowest-cost supplier and the price charged by the producer is a function of the production cost of the second lowest-cost supplier.
Trade is Ricardian as in Eaton and Kortum (2002) , since productivity is allowed to vary by country. The productivity of producing a variety ω in country i is a random variable drawn from a Frechet distribution characterized by T it and by the shape parameter θ > 1:
A higher T it reflects higher fundamental productivity of that sector, whereas a lower θ reflects higher dispersion of productivity in the country.
Given these distributional assumptions, we can show that
where
is the markup, and Γ[.] is the gamma function. Also,
Given the distributional assumptions on productivity, the probability that country n is the lowest-cost supplier to country i is
Since there is a continuum of intermediate goods, it follows that π in,t is also the fraction of goods that country n sells to country i. Formally, the share that country i spends on goods from country n is
Here X it = P it Y it represents country i's total expenditure on goods and X in,t denotes the value of intermediate products that country i buys from country n.
In the model, T it represents the stock of knowledge available in country i at time t. We next describe the determinants of the evolution of T it .
The Stock of Knowledge: Innovation and Knowledge Spillovers
Here we describe the main drivers of the evolution of the stock of knowledge in a country:
innovation and knowledge spillovers. This section is based on a one-sector modified version of Cai, Santacreu, and Li (2017) . In each country i there is a continuum of entrepreneurs who invest final output Y r nt to come up with a new idea. Ideas are blueprints to produce an intermediate good more efficiently. Research efforts are targeted at any good in the continuum. There is a Poisson arrival of ideas, which is given by
Here λ n T nt represents the efficiency of innovation, where λ n > 0 is a country-specific parameter that represents policy. The parameter β r ∈ (0, 1) represents diminishing returns to R&D.
New ideas are characterized by two random variables: the good to which they apply, which we assume is drawn from a uniform distribution [0, 1] , and the quality of the idea, which we assume is Pareto.
Ideas can diffuse exogenously across countries. We assume that the time lag for an idea developed in country n to diffuse to country i is exponentially distributed with parameter ε in . Diffused ideas increase the stock of knowledge of the country. In this sense, diffused ideas are non-rival.
The stock of knowledge of a country is composed of its domestic ideas and the foreign ideas have diffused to that country. The evolution of the stock of knowledge is characterized by the following expression:
The evolution of the stock of knowledge in country i at time t depends on the past research 9 outcomes in each country before time t and diffused at rate ε in .
An innovator can use her ideas to produce domestically or can license the idea to a foreign producer to penetrate a foreign market. That is, an idea from country i that has diffused to country n can be adopted to produce an intermediate good in country n. We assume that an innovator in country i, in order to penetrate the foreign market, licenses the technology to a foreign producer who, if successful, can use it to produce an intermediate good. In this case, we say that an intermediate producer in country n adopts the idea from country i.
An idea is adopted if its quality surpasses the productivity of the best idea in that country, which given the distributional assumptions assumed in the paper, occurs with probability 1/T nt (see Kortum, 1996, 1999; Cai, Santacreu, and Li, 2017 , for more details).
If the idea gets adopted, the foreign producer in country n pays the innovator in country i a royalty fee for the right to use those ideas. In that sense, adopted ideas are excludable.
The value of an innovator in country i is
where Π ns are profits given by
Note that we assume perfect enforcement of IPR and that the innovator gets royalties from profits that the adopter makes both domestically and abroad.
Market Clearing Conditions
The labor market clearing condition is
Final output Total income is composed of labor income and profits
Trade is not balanced in each country, because we need to take into account royalty payments across countries. Hence, the balanced of payments equation is
where RP it is the amount of royalties country i gets from ideas that have been adopted by country n, which is given by
where ω nit is the fraction of ideas that have been developed in i and adopted by n. We provide an expression for ω nit later. With perfect enforcement of IPR, ξ nt = 1.
A Structural Gravity Equation
Here we derive a gravity-type equation for bilateral royalty payments between country i and country n (RP ni in equation 16) along the balanced growth path (BGP). In the BGP the stock of knowledge, T , grows at a constant rate, g, which is common for all countries (see Cai, Santacreu, and Li, 2017, for details) . We stationarize all variables so that they are constant on the BGP; for notational simplicity, we drop all time subindexes.
We begin by deriving an expression for ω ni , which is the stock of ideas that country n has adopted from country i as a fraction of the total stock of ideas in country n; that is
We can obtain 17 from equation 10. Along the BGP, the stock of knowledge is
From this expression,
Hence,
Equation ( the characteristics of the importer n,
; and the strength of knowledge flows between them, ε ni . We can express equation (20) as
, and d ni = log
. Summing up, in the case of perfect enforcement of IPR, the main determinants of royalty payments between a source country (exporter) and a destination country (importer) depend on how innovative the source is, the profitability of the destination, and the knowledge linkages between the source and destination.
Empirical Strategy
We start by estimating equation (21) using bilateral royalty payments data for 53 countries during the period 1995-2012. 6 We do a PPML estimation in which we include exportertime, importer-time, and bilateral fixed effects. 7 We then use equation (20) to infer the economic fundamentals explaining the exporter and importer fixed effects. In particular, we use data on R&D spending and GDP per capita for the technology exporter together with data on market penetration and the size of the technology importer to estimate the structural parameters governing the exporter and importer fixed effects, respectively. Note that we derived the gravity equation along the BGP. However, when doing our empirical analysis, we exploit the time dimension of the data, as we are interested in capturing the evolution of international technology diffusion over time.
6 The list of countries is reported in Appendix B.
7 We use the Stata command developed by Zylkin (2018) .
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Gravity Regression
Using equation (21), we perform a PPML estimation of bilateral royalty payments on a country-pair fixed effect-our proxy for the strength of knowledge spillovers between two countries-and include exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects. We include the variable RTA in the right-hand side of the regression to implement the method in Zylkin (2018) .
The estimated coefficient of that variable is positive (0.137) but statistically insignificant.
The R-squared of that regression is 0.98. Figure 1 shows how the gravity regression using country-time and country-pair fixed effects fits the data almost perfectly. From the PPML regression, we recover the country-pair fixed effects which, through the lenses of our model, we interpret as the strength of knowledge spillovers. Note that our estimated bilateral fixed effects are symmetric, so that the probability that a technology transfers successfully from China to the United States is different than that from the United States to China. These parameters are treated as exogenous in the model. However, one could think that geography and cultural variables impact the strength of knowledge linkages between countries. Following this reasoning, we regress the estimated pair fixed effects on the standard geography and cultural variables used in the gravity literature (i.e., distance and sharing a common language). Table 1 shows that, not surprisingly, distance has a negative effect on the strength of knowledge spillovers, whereas common language has a positive and statistically significant effect. However, these variables alone can only explain about 10% of the variation in the pair fixed effects. Next, we control for bilateral trade flows between the exporter and the importer and include the same geographic and cultural variables used
previously. As the table shows, trade appears to have a positive and statistically significant effect; that is, country pairs that trade more with each other have a higher probability of sharing technology. Distance and common language still have the right signs. The results from this regression suggest that there are other components of trade beyond geography and culture that matter for explaining the strength of knowledge spillovers between countries.
However, adding trade to the regression increases the R-squared only to 0.22, so trade and geography are not good enough predictors of knowledge spillovers. For that reason, both in our model and in our empirical analysis we remain agnostic about the main drivers of ε in and we treat them and a parameter measured by the bilateral fixed effect obtained after estimating the gravity equation.
Finally, we can also control for the structure of production of the country that receives the technology. To do that, we compute the following measure of technology-intensive production of country i that receives technology from country n, p int , as
where V A j it is the value added of technology-importing country i in sector j at time t and P j nt is the number of patents of technology-exporting country n in sector j at time t. Higher values of technology-intensive production measure indicate that the importing-technology country specializes in sectors in which the exporting-technology country innovates more.
Hence, we should expect larger technology transfers in such cases (see Figure 2 ). The table shows the effect of geography and cultural variables on the pair fixed effects that were estimated in the gravity regression. In the second column we control for exporter and importer fixed effects to account for the asymmetry in the pair fixed effects.
(1) (2)
log ( Next, we analyze the exporter and importer fixed effects obtained in our gravity regression. These fixed effects contain information about the main economic characteristics driving international technology transfer (see equation 20). In particular, the exporter fixed effects are mainly driven by the exporter's R&D spending and productivity; the importer fixed effects are mainly driven by the expected profitability of the country that receives the technology (i.e., the importer). To be consistent with our model, we measure the expected profitability of the importer by its size and by how remote it is from other markets where it could sell its products. GDP (1995-2012, logs) Figure 4 reproduces the graphs in Figure 3 for each country, averaging across time. The results are consistent with our model, although we can identify a few outliers that do not conform to the predictions of our model. For instance, the United States seems to be sending more technology abroad (i.e, it has a very large exporter fixed effect) than its productivity level predicts. Table 2 shows that the exporter fixed effects are explained by the exporter's R&D spending and productivity. The value of the effect of R&D spending on the exporter fixed effect is 0.325, which corresponds to the value of parameter β r in our model, and is consistent with values for the parameter found in the literature (see, Kortum, 1996, 1999) . These two variables alone (i.e., R&D intensity and GDP per capita of the exporter) explain around 60% of the variation in the exporter fixed effects. The results in Table 3 show that remoteness has a negative, although statistically insignificant, impact on the importer fixed effects; size has a positive and statistically significant effect on the importer fixed effects. The effect on size is consistent with the predictions of our model. Larger countries should be receiving more technology. However, remoteness should have a negative and statistically significant impact on the importer fixed effect. When we regress the importer fixed effect on each variable individually, the results are consistent with our theory. However, when we add the two variables together in the regression, size seems to matter more than the remoteness index in explaining the importer fixed effect. These two variables together explain around 78% of the variation in the importer fixed effect. Belarus and Lithuania are all transferring less. On the importer side, Ireland, Singapore, and Switzerland are receiving more technology than predicted by the model, whereas India, Russia, and China are receiving less. We elaborate more on these results in the next section. Table 4 ). The exporter's R&D spending and productivity and the importer's size have a positive and statistically significant effect on cross-country royalty payments.
Remoteness has a negative and statistically significant effect. Finally, distance has a negative and statistically significant effect on bilateral royalty payments, whereas sharing a common language has a positive and statistically significant effect. We use the results from the first column of Table 4 to plot the evolution of international technology transfer across countries. We start from the baseline model (first column of the table). Figure 6 shows royalty payments for the first group of countries, that is, countries for which the data conforms to the model. Ireland, Luxembourg, and Singapore. The taxation system in these countries makes them attractive to receive technology for reasons other than profitability or market access. From these results, it seems that the discrepancies between the model and the data are mainly driven by characteristics of the technology importer that are not captured in our model, rather than by omitted characteristics of the technology exporter. To explore this point further, we repeat the regression in the first column of Table 4 , controlling for importer fixed effects (second column), exporter fixed effects (third column), and both importer and exporter fixed effects (fourth column). Including importer fixed effects improves significantly the fit of the model. Indeed, the R-squared increases from 0.43 to 0.73. Instead, including exporter fixed effects increases the R-squared to 0.47. Including both importer and exporter fixed effects increases the R-squared to 0.84. Hence, discrepancies between the model and the data are mainly driven by omitted characteristics of the technology importer: Lithuania, Turkey, Latvia, and Belarus have the lowest importer fixed effects, indicating that they received much less technology than what their economic fundamentals based on size and profitability predict; Ireland, Singapore, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Canada have the largest importer fixed effects, indicating that they receive much more technology than their economic fundamentals predict.
We now focus on exploring what omitted features in the model, from the perspective of the importer, could be explaining discrepancies in technology transfer between the model and the data. We start by collecting the value of the importer fixed effect that we obtained from the regression displayed in the third column of Table 4 . Then, we propose three potential drivers of the discrepancies between the model and the data in terms of technology transfer.
First, we look at the role of IPR protection. As Maskus (2004) Second, differences in regulations and taxation between countries could be driving technology transfer through licensing away from economic fundamentals. We use data from the GCI historical dataset for the following indicators: (i) the tax rate (as a percentage) of profits for our countries of analysis and the period 1995-2012. The idea is that countries with high corporate income taxes may be tempted to transfer their technology to a with such lower rates, as documented recently by Guvenen et al. (2017); Bruner, Rassier, and Ruhl (2018);  (ii) the amount of FDI and technology transfers, which measures to what extent FDI brings new technology in another country. This may also be driven by tax incentives; and (iii) the degree of foreign ownership of firms in the technology-importing country. A large amount of foreign ownership could increase or decrease technology transfer. If foreign-owned companies hold patents rather than license them, then we should see less technology transfer. If, instead, they license the patents, we should observe more technology transfers. Figure 10 plots the correlation between the importer fixed effect from the regression displayed in the third column of Table 4 and the three from the GCI dataset that capture the effect of differences in taxation. We observe a clear negative correlation between taxation and the importer fixed effect, suggesting that, controlling for the fundamentals of our model higher tax countries will receive less technology. We also observe a clear positive correlation between the importer fixed effect and the amount of FDI that brings new technology into the country and the presence of foreign ownership into the technology-importing country.
Figure 10: Differences in regulations and taxation The figure plots the correlation between the three variables from the GCI dataset capturing regulation and taxation, and the level of development of the technology-importing country and the importer fixed effect from the regression displayed in the third column of Table 4 , respectively. The third column of Table 5 controls for the variables reflecting IPR protection and regulation and taxation. We find that they all have a statistically significant coefficient and the signs are as expected. Better IPR protection increases the amount of technology transfer between countries. Also, countries with a higher corporate income tax receive less technology on average, whereas countries with more FDI aimed at increasing technology transfer, receive more technology on average. Once we control for all these variables, we find that the presence of foreign ownership decreases technology transfer on average, suggesting that in those countries, firms may own the foreign patents. The estimated coefficient on the remaining variables that capture model fundamentals remain the same. The R 2 increases from 0.44 to 0.66 once we control for the additional variables. Figures 11-14 show, for the same countries for which we showed discrepancies between the model and the data in Figures 6-8 , data on royalty payments together with the predicted royalty payments from the regression in the third column of Table 5 in which we control for IPR protection and regulation and taxation. In Figure 11 , we do not observe substantial differences between the evolution of royalty payments in our baseline model and those where we control for the additional variables. In Figure 12 , however, we observe that once we control for the additional variables, developing countries start receiving technology transfers more according to the data. We find that, in the case of developing countries, discrepancies between the model and the data were mainly driven by differences in IPR enforcement.
8 That is, once we control for the fact that IPR enforcement in India, Argentina, and China is lower than that for the average country, measured royalty payments become closer to those predicted by the model. In the case of India, there are still some discrepancies between the model and the data.
We address this issue later by controlling for the structure of production. In Figure 14 we observe that controlling for the additional variables, Ireland starts paying royalties to the United States that are closer to what the model would predict. This gap is mainly closed by controlling for our FDI and technology transfer variable. However, we still observe substantial differences in what countries with low corporate income taxes pay in IP. We try to address this issue next. One reason why countries with low corporate income taxes are receiving too much foreign technology may be because of profit-shifting motives in countries with higher corporate income taxes. In this case, we may observe that technology transfer, as captured by royalties, is more frequent to affiliate firms than to unaffiliated parties. Unfortunately, we do not have data for the proportion of royalty payments explained by affiliated versus unaffiliated parties for all the countries in our sample. However, these data are available for the United States from the International Transactions, International Services, and International Investment Position Tables reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
9 We collect data for "Charges for the use of intellectual property" paid and received to and from the United
States that are from and to the same countries analyzed in our sample. These data are also disaggregated by type of affiliation (affiliated versus unaffiliated parties). In 2012, 35% of all royalty payments received by the United States proceeded from unaffiliated parties. These numbers vary substantially across countries. In Ireland, for instance, only 10% of royalty payments to the United States proceeded from unaffiliated firms, while in China 75% did. For
Ireland, this suggests that there may be a lot of transfer pricing and profit-shifting motives in IP transfers with the United States, and we should observe a lot of royalty payments from the United States to Ireland once we control for the fraction of unaffiliated payments between these countries. We conduct the regression of royalty payments on economic fundamentals controlling for IPR protection, regulation, and taxation and the share of IP payments to and from unaffiliated firms. Note that we only have data only for the United States as the importer and exporter of technology when we control for unaffiliated transactions. Figure 14 reports the evolution of IP payments between the United States and Ireland predicted by this regression and compares it to that predicted by a model that does not control for unaffiliated transactions and that observed in the data. Controlling for the share of unaffiliated firms receiving technology helps improve the fit of the model. Finally, we control for differences in the structure of production of the technologyimporting country. The idea is that a firm in a high R&D intensive industry of one country may not want to send its technology to another country that specializes in low R&D intensive industries, as the latter country will not be able to use the technology to generate profits.
Because our model is a one-sector multi-country economy, it does not take into account the structure of production of the importer of technology. We address each of the three points as follows. We use the measure in equation (22) and control for that measure in our regression.
The results are displayed in the fourth column of Table 5 . Countries with a structure of production more similar to the technology-exporting country receive, on average, more technology. In Figure 15 we use the results from this regression to plot the evolution of royalty payments from India to the United States. We find that once we control for the production structure of the technology importing country, technology transfer follows the data more closely.
Figure 15: Royalty payments: The structure of production The figure shows royalty payments from a technology-importing country to a technologyexporting country for the period 1995-2012 in (i) the data (solid), (ii) our baseline model (dashed), (iii) our model once we control for potential omitted variables from the technologyimporting country's perspective (dotted-dashed), and (iv) the model where we also control for the structure of production (long dashed). (1) (2)
India to United States
log ( We conduct a counterfactual exercise in which we evaluate, using our empirical model, how technology transfer to China would change if it improved its IPR protection. In particular, we consider the case in which the IPR protection index from the GCI historical dataset increases to the level of that for the United States. Then we use the results from the second column in Table 5 to compute the evolution of IP payments from China to the United States.
The results are shown in Figure 16 . They show that if China had the same quality of IPR protection as the United States, technology transfer to China from the United States should have been, on average during the period of analysis, 57% higher. States to China would have been, on average during the period of analysis, 57% higher.
Our analysis has identified several important channels that would be relevant to add to our model in order to do a full-blown quantitative analysis of international technology transfer. First, it would be interesting to extend our model to include the patenting decision of the innovators in case there is imperfect enforcement of IPR (i.e., when there is a positive probability of imitation or misappropriation of a foreign technology). Second, we could introduce the decision of the firm to establish a foreign affiliate that can use the technology to produce the good. We leave these extensions and more formal quantitative analysis of the model for future research.
